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InTroDucTIon 
Last September’s historic agreement under the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the phase-out of hydrochlorofluo-rocarbons (“HCFCs”) marked the first time both devel-
oped and developing countries explicitly agreed to accept binding 
and enforceable commitments to address climate change.1 This 
is particularly significant because the decision was taken by 
consensus by the 191 Parties to the Protocol—all but five coun-
tries recognized by the United 
Nations.2 Accelerating the 
HCFC phase-out could reduce 
emissions by sixteen billion 
tons of carbon dioxide-equiva-
lent (“CO2e”) through 2040.
3 In 
terms of radiative forcing, this 
will delay climate change by up 
to 1.5 years.4 This is because, in 
addition to depleting the ozone 
layer, HCFCs also are potent 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)—
with some thousands of times more powerful than carbon diox-
ide (“CO2”) at warming the planet. Thus, from September 2007 
both Montreal and Kyoto can be considered climate protection 
treaties.
The HCFC agreement and its climate benefits were possible 
largely because of the Montreal Protocol’s unique history of 
continuous adjustment to keep pace with scientific understand-
ing and technological capability.5 The Parties to the Protocol 
generally regard the treaty as fair, due to its objective techni-
cal assessment bodies and its effective financial mechanism, 
the Multilateral Fund. These features and others have made the 
Protocol the world’s most successful multilateral environmental 
agreement, phasing out ninety-five percent of global production 
of ozone-depleting substances in just twenty years and placing 
the ozone layer on a path to recovery.6
The Montreal Protocol offers additional opportunities to 
reduce GHG emissions further, including by creating greater 
incentives for the recovery and destruction of ozone-depleting 
substances currently in chemical inventory or contained in 
refrigerators, air conditioners, and other products and equipment 
still in service or not yet disposed.7 As with the HCFC agree-
ment, these opportunities can achieve immediate and substan-
tial reductions in GHG emissions, as well as further speed the 
recovery of the ozone layer. More significantly, they can be pur-
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sued immediately and independently of the international climate 
treaty negotiations. 
The monTreal proTocol:  
“sTarT anD sTrengThen”
In 1987, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol required a 
freeze in halon production and a fifty percent reduction in the 
production of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), and have continu-
ally strengthened the treaty since then as it became clear that 
ozone protection required that 
other ozone-depleting substances 
must be controlled and as new 
environmentally-superior substi-
tutes and alternatives were devel-
oped. This is one of the great 
strengths of the Protocol, and it 
did not arise by accident. To the 
contrary, the treaty is designed 
to be flexible, allowing the Par-
ties to strengthen and fine-tune 
its provisions to stay abreast of 
current scientific understanding and technological capability.8 
As Mostafa Tolba, the fomer UNEP Executive Director and 
“father” of the Montreal Protocol, has said of the treaty’s evolu-
tion: “Start and strengthen.” 9
Adding or removing substances from the treaty’s control 
measures generally requires an “amendment ,” which then must 
be ratified by each Party’s government.10 Amendments can be 
time-consuming, often taking years, or even decades, before 
every Party completes ratification. For example, the most recent 
“Beijing Amendment” agreed on in 1999 did not enter into force 
until January 2001 and today is ratified only by 135 of the 191 
The Montreal Protocol 
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Parties to the Montreal Protocol. The treaty has been amended 
four times.11
But the Parties can change or, more specifically, accelerate 
the Protocol’s phase-out schedules by “adjustment ,” a procedure 
used six times. Adjustments do not require ratification and take 
effect within six months of agreement, except for parties that 
affirmatively opt out. In the United States, for example, Con-
gress included “adjustments adopted by the Parties thereto and 
amendments that have entered 
into force” in its definition of the 
Montreal Protocol when it incor-
porated its provisions into the 
1990 Amendments to the Clean 
Air Act.12
The adjustment procedure 
was instrumental in the evolution 
of the Protocol. The original text 
of the 1987 Protocol included 
only CFCs and halon ozone- depleting substances and required 
developed countries to phase out fifty percent of CFC production 
by 2000 and to freeze halon production. This was woefully inad-
equate in terms of protecting the ozone layer, but nevertheless a 
political and diplomatic triumph given concerns at the time that 
the science was not yet certain, the substitutes did not yet exist, 
and the projected costs looked prohibitive. 
Shortly after the Protocol entered into force, the science 
of stratospheric ozone depletion and the Antarctic Ozone Hole 
were confirmed with empirical evidence—showing that the 
situation was potentially more grave than originally perceived. 
The modest control measures imposed in 1987 created a market 
for substitutes and alternatives, which were quickly developed 
and deployed. And many businesses complied at no cost or, in 
some cases, at a profit. As a result, the fifty percent phase-out of 
CFCs by 2000 was subsequently adjusted in 1990 to require a 
seventy-five percent phase-out by 1998 (and one-hundred per-
cent by 2000), and then adjusted again in 1992 to require a one-
hundred percent phase-out by 1996—all within the treaty’s first 
five years. Through amendment and adjustment, the Montreal 
Protocol now regulates ninety-six different chemicals used in 
more than 240 sectors and thousands of applications. 
rapID Increase In hcFc use ThreaTens 
 clImaTe as well as ozone
At their nineteenth meeting on September 22, 2007, the 
Parties agreed to adjust the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the 
phase-out of HCFCs. Fittingly, the meeting celebrated the twen-
tieth anniversary of the Montreal Protocol.
HCFCs are ozone-depleting substances regulated under 
the Montreal Protocol as “transitional” substitutes for the more 
damaging CFCs. Like CFCs, they were used in a variety of 
applications, including refrigerators and air conditioners, as 
foam blowing agents, and as chemical solvents. By 2006, it was 
clear that the use of HCFCs in developing countries was grow-
ing rapidly and threatening the recovery of the ozone layer and 
potentially undermining efforts to mitigate climate change.
Estimates reported by the Montreal Protocol’s Technology 
and Economic Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) showed that HCFC 
use could exceed 700,000 tonnes by 2015—roughly five times 
more than the TEAP’s 1998 projection of just 163,000 tonnes.13 
The Protocol’s Scientific Assessment Panel reported in 2006 
that the recovery of the ozone layer to pre-1980 levels would 
likely be delayed by fifteen years over Antarctica, to 2065, and 
by five years at mid-latitudes, to 2049, with the delay at mid-
latitudes partly due to the high 
estimates of future produc-
tion of HCFCs.14 In addition, 
the Environmental Investiga-
tion Agency reported in 2006 
that HCFC emissions by 2015 
could cancel out the reductions 
achieved by the Kyoto Proto-
col during its first commitment 
period of 2008–2012.15
The increased HCFC use was driven partly by economic 
growth in developing countries and by a “perverse incentive” 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”).16 The most commonly used HCFC is HCFC-22, 
which produces by-product emissions of HFC-23 when it is 
manufactured. Under the CDM, eligible HCFC-22 producers in 
developing countries could generate Certified Emissions Reduc-
tions (“CERs”) by capturing and destroying HFC-23 by-product 
emissions.17 HFC-23 is a super-GHG with a global warming 
potential (“GWP”) of 11,700.18 HFC-23 CERs could earn up 
to ten times the cost of capturing and destroying HFC-23 emis-
sions and are exceeding the sales revenue of HCFC-22,19 effec-
tively subsidizing the cost of producing HCFC-22 and driving 
its expanded use, including in applications where it has not been 
widely used or had already been replaced.20 
The original HCFC control measures were not negotiated 
with these higher than expected levels in mind. Originally, 
the Montreal Protocol required developing countries to freeze 
HCFC consumption by 2016 at 2015 levels and phase-out one 
hundred percent of HCFC production by 2040. It required devel-
oped countries to phase out 99.5 percent of HCFCs by 2020, 
with 0.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until 
2030.21 By early 2007, there was concern that without urgent 
action, developing countries would have difficulty in complying 
with the 2016 freeze and the 2040 phase-out.22 
monTreal proTocol’s success maDe IT  
The worlD’s besT clImaTe TreaTy
As it approached its twentieth anniversary, the Montreal 
Protocol already was widely considered the world’s most suc-
cessful multilateral environmental agreement. But what many 
did not know is that its success in phasing out ozone-depleting 
substances also made it the world’s best climate treaty—so far.
The publication of a groundbreaking paper in the Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences (“PNAS”) calculated 
the climate benefits of the Montreal Protocol, and the results 
helped spur the international community to action.23 Because 
The adjustment procedure 
was instrumental in the 
evolution of the Protocol.
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CFCs are such potent GHGs, the Montreal Protocol is reducing 
emissions by 135 GtCO2e between 1990 and 2010 and delaying 
climate forcing by seven to twelve years.24 When pre-Montreal 
Protocol efforts to protect the ozone layer are included, such as 
voluntary reductions in CFCs and domestic regulations in the 
1970s, the delay in climate forcing is thirty-five to forty-one 
years.25
The PNAS article drew greater attention to both the ozone 
and the climate impacts of the increased HCFC use. It became 
the foundation for key Parties and non-governmental organiza-
tions to make the case for strengthening the Montreal Protocol 
by accelerating the HCFC phase-out to maximize its climate 
benefits—as well as to ensure the continued success of the treaty 
in protecting the ozone layer. In particular, the article received 
considerable attention at meetings of the Stockholm Group, an 
informal gathering of ozone and climate experts that played a 
critical role in reviewing the technical and economic data sup-
porting an accelerated HCFC phase-out and building consensus 
among developed and developing country governments. 
proposals To acceleraTe hcFc phase-ouT 
cITeD clImaTe beneFITs
In March 2007, an “unusual coalition” of nine Parties sub-
mitted six separate proposals (some jointly) to accelerate the 
phase-out of HCFCs.26 Proposals came from both developed 
and developing countries, and nearly all cited the potential cli-
mate benefits of an accelerated HCFC phase-out, as well as the 
ozone benefits. Small island and coastal developing countries, 
including Argentina, Brazil, Mauritius, and the Federated States 
of Micronesia, were among the Parties stressing the need to 
take immediate action to mitigate the causes of climate change 
as part of their justification for an accelerated HCFC phase-out. 
The United States also referenced climate considerations in its 
proposal, which put forward one of the most aggressive acceler-
ated phase-out schedules. 
The Parties met at the 27th Open-Ended Working Group in 
June 2007, to discuss the proposals and recognized a “clear need 
to accelerate the timetable for the phase-out of ozone-depleting 
substances, in particular HCFCs.”27 On June 7, the G8 Summit 
Declaration added further support, committing to “accelerating 
the phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency 
and climate change objectives.”28
As the twentieth anniversary Meeting of the Parties 
approached, key Parties and influential scientists and policy-
makers began to weigh in on the HCFC issue. Dr. Mario Molina, 
who in 1995 shared the Nobel Prize with Dr. Sherwood Row-
land for their work in the 1970s on the impacts CFCs had on the 
ozone layer, wrote an influential opinion piece for the Financial 
Times of London, stating, 
Now it is time for the ozone treaty to make its role in 
reducing climate emissions more explicit. This should 
start next month with an agreement among the par-
ties to accelerate the phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons 
in a way that promotes energy efficiency and climate 
change objectives. . . . In the light of the short time 
before we reach the planet’s ‘tipping point,’ they can-
not afford to fail.29
As the negotiations progressed, the key questions, particu-
larly for developing countries, were the availability of substitutes 
and whether assistance through the treaty’s financial mechanism, 
the Multilateral Fund, would be available. 
With regard to substitutes, the evidence clearly showed that 
they were commercially available for virtually all HCFC appli-
cations. The UNEP 2007 Synthesis Report concluded that tech-
nically and economically feasible substitutes were available for 
almost all HCFC applications.30 
Financing the accelerated phase-out was more complicated. 
Under the 1990 Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, devel-
oped country Parties must provide financial assistance, through 
the Multilateral Fund, to developing country Parties to cover the 
agreed incremental costs of making the transition out of ozone-
depleting substances and into more environmentally friendly 
substitutes and alternatives. Thus far, the Fund has disbursed 
approximately $2.3 billion in financial assistance. The high lev-
els of HCFC use, particularly in China, meant that the amount 
of financial assistance would need to increase substantially to 
cover incremental costs for HCFCs at a time when many donor 
Parties were expecting financing for the Montreal Protocol to be 
winding down. Indeed, many thought the ozone layer problem 
had already been solved and the time had come to discontinue 
the Montreal Protocol itself. 
hcFc agreemenT provIDes For  
clImaTe-FrIenDly subsTITuTes anD FInancIng
After a week of intense negotiations in Montreal, the Par-
ties reached an agreement to accelerate the HCFC phase-out.31 
For developing countries, the new control measures shift the 
base year from 2015 to an average of 2009 and 2010 and the 
freeze date from 2016 to 2013. Developing countries must then 
phase-out ten percent of production by 2015, thirty-five percent 
by 2020, 67.5 percent by 2025, and 97.5 percent by 2030, with 
2.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until 2040. 
Developed countries, many of which have already completed a 
transition out of HCFCs, must now phase-out seventy-five per-
cent of production by 2010, instead of sixty-five percent, with 
a 99.5 percent phase-out by 2020, and 0.5 percent allowed for 
servicing existing equipment until 2030.
Accelerating the HCFC phase-out will reduce emissions an 
estimated sixteen GtCO2e or more through 2040, with the actual 
climate benefits depending on the success replacing HCFCs with 
zero and low GWP substitutes, and/or preventing future emis-
sions of these substitutes by providing for a robust system to 
recover and recycle or destroy used chemicals at equipment end-
of-life.32 
In an effort to maximize these potential climate benefits, the 
adjustment decision calls on the Parties to “promote the selec-
tion of alternatives to HCFCs that minimize environmental 
impacts, in particular impacts on climate” and to give priority to 
“substitutes and alternatives that minimize other impacts on the 
environment, including on the climate, taking into account glob-
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al-warming potential, energy use, and other relevant factors.”33
By explicitly referencing the climate impacts of HCFC sub-
stitutes and alternatives, the adjustment marks the first time that 
both developed and developing countries have agreed to accept 
binding commitments to mitigate climate change. 
The adjustment decision also includes provisions to ensure 
that developing countries receive financial assistance through the 
Multilateral Fund to make the transition out of HCFCs, although 
the details of implementation will continue to be negotiated at 
the Fund’s Executive Committee 
meetings. 
The agreement was hailed 
worldwide. Achim Steiner, the 
Executive Director of the United 
Nations Environment Programme, 
called it “the most important 
breakthrough in an environmen-
tal negotiation process for at 
least five or six years because it 
sets a very specific target with an 
ambitious timetable.”34 Romina 
Picolotti, Argentina’s Minister 
of Environment and an early and 
vocal proponent of the accelerated HCFC phase-out, described it 
as “important for the ozone layer, and even more important for 
the climate. It shows us what we can do when we have the spirit 
to cooperate.”35 
nexT up aT The monTreal proTocol:  
creaTIng greaTer IncenTIves  
For The recovery anD DesTrucTIon oF banKs
There are several other measures that the Parties can take 
that will mitigate climate change, including the “practical mea-
sures” developed as part of the Ozone Secretariat’s Workshop on 
the IPCC/TEAP Special Report held in July 2006.36 The TEAP 
calculates that an accelerated HCFC phase-out plus the “practi-
cal measures” identified at the Workshop can result in cumula-
tive emissions reductions of about 1.25 million ozone depleting 
potential (“ODP”) tonnes and thirty GtCO2e.
37 
In particular, banks of CFCs and other ozone-depleting sub-
stances (“ODSs”) represent a significant threat to the ozone layer 
and the climate. Banks are defined as ODSs contained in exist-
ing equipment (e.g. air conditioners and refrigerators), products 
(e.g. foam insulation), and stockpiles (e.g. the military stock-
piles various chemicals for specialized uses). These exist in both 
developed and developing Parties. Approximately 7.4 GtCO2e 
of CFCs, currently contained in banks of existing equipment and 
products, is expected to be released into the atmosphere between 
2002 and 2015.38 There will be additional significant emissions 
beyond 2015 as more CFC and HCFC-based equipment reaches 
end-of-life.39 
Emissions of CFCs and other ODSs from banks could be 
avoided by creating greater incentives for their recovery and 
destruction. This should include allowing destruction credits to 
carry forward for more than one year, to be traded between Par-
ties, and to transfer among chemical groups, where the destruc-
tion of an amount of one chemical, for example, CFCs, would 
allow the production or consumption of an equal amount, on an 
ODP-weighted basis, of an ODS from another chemical group, 
for example, HCFCs.40 It could include programs to encourage 
greater recovery and recycling or destruction, such as Refrig-
erant Reclaim Australia.41 In addition, the Chicago Climate 
Exchange issued the first carbon offset methodology in late 2007 
that would allow the destruction of ODS banks to generate offset 
credits.42 
One additional benefit of 
a robust recovery and recycle/
destruction program is that it 
undercuts the traditional para-
digm where consumption of 
ODS or ODS substitutes is 
treated as equal to emissions. 
With guaranteed recovery and 
destruction, it would be pos-
sible to allow the continued 
use of certain chemicals whose 
direct impacts on the ozone and 
the climate may be high, but 
whose indirect benefits, such as 
improved energy efficiency, make them desirable to available 
alternatives.43
There is growing support for new measures creating greater 
incentives for the recovery and destruction of banks. At the Sep-
tember 2007 Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 
the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Stephen Johnson, challenged, “all delegations to consider ways 
of destroying the banks of ozone-depleting substances cur-
rently installed in equipment. These large sources of CFCs and 
other ozone-depleting substances represent a ripe opportunity 
to both further protect the ozone layer and to reduce emissions 
that contribute to global climate change.”44 At the December 
2007 Climate Conference in Bali, the United States, Argentina, 
Micronesia, and Mauritius answered this challenge at a side 
event organized by the Institute for Governance & Sustainable 
Development, where they stated their interest in strengthening 
the Montreal Protocol to address the threat from banks.
oTher measures
Other strategies for strengthening the Montreal Protocol 
were described in the original SDLP article,45 including exempt-
ing HCFC-123 from phase-out and allowing its continued use 
until superior substitutes are developed, based on its negligible 
ozone impacts and the energy efficiency advantage of HCFC-123 
chillers over the primary alternative, HFC-134a, where HCFC-
123 results in lower GHG emissions associated with power gen-
eration to run the chillers, as well as lower operating costs over 
the thirty-year life of the equipment.
The Montreal Protocol also should strengthen its compli-
ance efforts by building on work already underway in the Secre-
tariat, UNEP OzonAction’s compliance assistance program, and 
elsewhere, to promote an ambitious capacity building program. 
This can be accomplished by linking with the Green Customs 
In March 2007, an 
“unusual coalition” of 
nine Parties submitted 
proposals to accelerate the 
phase-out of HCFCs.
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Initiative of UNEP, and the International Network for Environ-
mental Compliance & Enforcement. A much more aggressive 
effort is warranted by the combined ozone and climate benefits 
from strict compliance.
With regard to the use of ODSs for feedstocks, process 
agents, and quarantine and preshipment (“QPS”) applications, 
requiring mandatory periodic review of current uses and their 
direct and indirect impacts on the ozone and climate, utilizing a 
Life Cycle Analysis, would lay the groundwork for future action 
banning the use of ODSs where alternatives that are less harmful 
to the environment are available. Half of the HCFC-22 produced 
today is used as feedstocks and process agents exempt from the 
Montreal Protocol accelerated phaseout; and thus half of the 
global emissions of HFC-23, a super GHG, is a consequence 
of allowing exempted HCFC uses. Unfortunately, the Montreal 
Protocol and its TEAP have not yet investigated the technical 
feasibility of reducing and eliminating these uses—including the 
options of not-in-kind technology for the products that currently 
depend on HCFCs in production.  
Finally, the Montreal Protocol also should require use of the 
concept of Life Cycle Climate Performance (“LCCP”), which is 
considered a practical elaboration of Life-Cycle Analysis. LCCP 
was proposed by the TEAP to calculate the “cradle-to-grave” cli-
mate impacts of the use of ODSs in equipment. Direct emissions 
result from the leaks of chemicals into the atmosphere. Indirect 
emissions result from the energy consumption due to manufac-
turing, operation, and disposal at the end of product life and 
also account for the carbon content of the fuel utilized in each 
process and product life. The Mobile Air Conditioning Climate 
Protection Partnership has posted its LCCP model on the U.S. 
EPA website showing the combined climate life cycle impact 
of refrigerant greenhouse gases directly emitted and the indirect 
greenhouse gas emissions of fuel used to produce, power, trans-
port, and dispose the equipment.46 
conclusIon
The Montreal Protocol and its success in protecting both 
the ozone layer and the climate show that global environmen-
tal problems can be solved through international cooperation. 
As the world works toward a post-2012 climate treaty, the 
 twenty-year history of the Montreal Protocol offers invaluable 
lessons for climate negotiators and demonstrates the potential 
of international environmental law in the pursuit of sustainable 
development.47
Climate mitigation under the Montreal Protocol is one of 
several key strategies for achieving immediate climate mitiga-
tion, along with strategies for energy efficiency, reductions in 
black carbon, or soot, expansion of renewables, and enhance-
ment and protection of forests and other sinks. These and other 
immediate mitigation strategies are needed to buy critical time 
to develop a sufficiently strong post-2012 climate regime. 
It is impossible to say just how much the planet will warm 
before triggering abrupt climate changes, but critical thresh-
olds could be as near as ten years away, and it is imperative 
to strengthen the Montreal Protocol to avoid every ton of CO2e 
emissions that it can. In addition to finishing the job of protect-
ing the ozone layer, this is one of the best insurance policies the 
world can buy to give us time to succeed with our long-term 
climate controls. And it is an insurance policy that we can be 
confident will be delivered by the world’s best environmental 
treaty.
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